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BANK-DEPOSITOR RELATIONS UNDER ARTICLE
FOUR OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
Article Four of the Uniform Commercial Code,' has, in
the main, aided the flow of the tremendous number of checks
through the collection process.2 The majority of checks clear
without incident, and therefore litigation is rarely involved.
Many of the problems that arise deal with situations in which
there are insufficient funds in the drawer's account. These
checks are normally returned promptly through the collection
chain back to the depositor or payee of the check, who initiates
further action against the drawer.3
Many of the problems which have reached courts deal
with the provisions of Article Four concerning the relation-
ship between the payor bank and its depositor; more specifi-
cally the provisions dealing with the concept of final payment,
liability for failure to act promptly, wrongful dishonor, and
stop payment orders. The purpose of this article is to examine
these problems from the standpoint of the payor (sometimes
called the drawee) bank, in an attempt to define its various
rights and obligations.
II. THE CONCEPT OF FINAL PAYMENT
Section 4-213 provides in part:
(1) An item is finally paid by a payor bank when the bank has done
any of the following, whichever happens first:
(a) paid the item in cash; or
(b) settled for the item without reserving a right to revoke the
settlement and without having such right under statute, clear-
ing house rule or agreement; or
We recommend this article as a general overview of the area of bank-
depositor relations. For an in depth study of the many problems in this area,
we refer the reader to other sources dealing with these areas specifically.
1. Hereinafter, all citations to the Code will refer to the 1962 official
version.
2. Uniform Commercial Code §4-101, Comment (hereinafter U.C.C.).
3. Wright, Bank Deposits and Collections and Letters of Credit, 43 NEB.
L. REv. 742, 746 (1964).
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(c) completed the process of posting the item to the indicated
account of the drawer, maker or other person to be charged
therewith; or
(d) made a provisional settlement for the item and failed to re-
voke the settlement in the time and manner permitted by
statute, clearing house rule or agreement.
The moment of final payment is important for a number
of reasons: (1) by virtue of Section 4-303, it may determine
priorities between items and notices, stop order, legal process
and setoffs; (2) under Section 4-213 (2) final payment marks
the point at which provisional debits or credits, including the
credits of the original depositor,4 become final or "firm up";
(3) under Section 4-214 final payment fixes preferential
rights in the event of a bank's insolvency; (4) under Section
4-201 a series of agency relationships are replaced with a
series of debtor-creditor relationships along the chain of col-
lecting banks; (5) the final, and perhaps most important
consequence of final payment is the payor bank's account-
ability for the amount of the item by virtue of Sections 4-213
(1) and 3-603 (1) -this simply means that the drawer of the
check is discharged and the payor bank is replaced as the
party responsible for the amount of the item.
This discussion is limited primarily to the determination
of priorities between items and notices, stop orders, legal
process and setoffs, for this area has given rise to the majority
of litigation. Professor Clark has described this priority
struggle as a "great race" between the payee or holder of the
check, and these possible parties: (1) the drawer seeking to
protect his account by a stop payment order; (2) the drawer's
judgment creditor in possession of a writ of attachment;
(3) the drawee bank seeking to exercise its right of setoff;
(4) the executor of the deceased drawer, seeking to notify
the bank to freeze the account; (5) the incompetent drawer's
conservator; and finally, (6) the drawer's trustee in bank-
ruptcy."
A discussion of each method of final payment under Sec-
tion 4-213 now follows.
4. U.C.C. §4-213(3).
5. B. CLARK & S. SQUILLANTE, T E LAW oF BANK DEPosITs, COLLECTIONS
AND CREDIT CARDS 112 (1970). See also U.C.C. §4-303(1).
[Vol. 24
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A. Payment in Cash. The Code has, in Section 4-213 (1)
(a), adopted the traditional view that payment in cash con-
stitutes final payment. 6 Such a rule is, however, deceptively
simple, as illustrated by the case of Kirby v. First and Mer-
chants National Bank.7 Here, on December 30, the defendant
payee, Mrs. Kirby, presented a check in the amount of
$2,500.00 to the plaintiff payor bank. The check had been
drawn on the bank by a local engineering company. The de-
fendant payee, who also had an account with the plaintiff,
made out a deposit slip, entering $2,300.00 in the "currency
column" and, depositing that amount, received the $200.00
balance in cash from the teller. On the following business day
the bank credited the payee's account in the amount of
$2,300.00. The next day the bank discovered there were insuf-
ficient funds in the drawer's account to cover the check, and
subsequently, upon the payee's refusal to make the check good,
charged the entire amount of $2,500.00 against the payee's
account. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held that
the $200.00 cash payment was a final payment under Section
4-213(1) (a) as to the entire amount. Therefore, the payee
was relieved of any liability and the charge against her ac-
count was improper. The court followed the basic pre-code
rule that a drawee who mistakenly pays a check has recourse
only against the drawer." The dissent, by two justices, stated
that in order to follow the majority's logic it would have to be
imagined that the defendant presented the check and received
$2,500.00 in cash and afterwards deposited $2,300.00 in her
account. The more logical analysis, according to the dissent,
-was that the check was accepted for deposit and clearance
as any other check and the bank merely permitted a with-
drawal of $200.00 as an accommodation to its customer.9
It should be noted that the majority opinion also em-
phasized that even if payment had not been in cash, the bank
had no right to charge the item to the payee's account since
it had failed to return the item or send written notice of dis-
6. See, e.g., Bellevue Bank of Allen Kimberly and Co. v. Security Nat'l.
Bank of Sioux City, 168 Iowa 707, 150 N.W. 1076 (1915); Fidelity and Cas.
Co. of New York v. Planenscheck, 200 Wis. 304, 227 N.W. 387 (1929).
7. 210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969).
8. Id. at 92, 168 S.E.2d at 276.
9. Id. at 94, 168 S.E.2d at 278 (dissenting opinion).
1972] NOTEs 841
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honor prior to its "midnight deadline" as required by Sections
4-212(3) and 4-301. Had the bank complied with these pro-
visions, perhaps the outcome would have been different.
B. Settlement Without Right to Revoke. Section 4-213
(1) (b) provides that an item is finally paid if the payor bank
settles without reserving a right to revoke, and without hav-
ing such a right by virtue of a statute, clearing house rule,
or agreement. In other words, if the settlement is in the first
instance final, then final payment has occurred. This section
would seem to apply only rarely, since Section 4-301 provides
a payor bank the right to revoke settlements for demand
items other than documentary draft.
C. Completion of the Process of Posting. The most im-
portant and controversial method of final payment under
Section 4-213 is the completion of the "process of posting."'1
Whereas the two methods of payment discussed above deal
with external acts between the payor and the holder of the
item, the "process of posting" method pertains strictly to the
internal procedures of the payor bank. The mechanical step
of posting the amount of the item to the drawer's account is
said to represent the point in time in which the decision of the
bank to pay or dishonor is made.:"
Section 4-109 defines the process of posting as:
the usual procedure followed by a payor bank in determining to pay
an item and in recording the payment, including one or more of the
following or other steps as determined by the bank;
(a) verification of any signature;
(b) ascertaining that sufficient funds are available;
(c) affixing a "paid" or other stamp;
(d) entering a charge or entry to a customer's account;
(e) correcting or revising an entry of erroneous action with
respect to the item.
The Comment to Section 4-109 states that the procedures
followed by banks in making a determination to pay may
vary, but that they all involve the two basic elements of (1)
some decision to pay, and (2) some recording of the payment.
The case of Gibbs v. Gerberich'2 illustrates that both of these
elements must exist. In this case the payor bank had received
10. See also U.C.C. §4-303(1) (d).
11. U.C.C. §4-213, Comment 5.
12. 1 Ohio App. 2d 93, 203 N.E.2d 851 (1964).
[Vol. 24
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a check drawn on a realtor's escrow account. The same day,
however, the bank received a restraining order prohibiting
any payments from that account. Thus, the question was
whether the check was "finally paid" prior to the receipt of
the restraining order. The payor bank's vice-president testi-
fied that the check had been charged against and posted to the
escrow account. However, he also testified that the check was
not voided or cancelled, for as a matter of routine, this was
not done until "the posting run is completed and the day's
posting is in balance." 13 Under these circumstances the court
found that the process of posting had not been completed since
there was no evidence to indicate "a decision by the bank to
pay." The court stated:
[t]he mere debiting of a customer's account does not per se indicate
a decision to pay. The key point in a bank's completion of the "process
of posting" is the completion of all the steps followed in the particular
bank's payment procedure. In the instant case, the "posting run" was
not completed, and the day's posting had not been found to be in bal-
ance prior to the receipt of the restraining order. The check had not
been "voided or cancelled" as it would have been if the "process of
posting" had been completed. It appears, therefore, that the statutory
"process of posting" had not been completed, and as a consequence,
the check had not been paid.' 4
The most controversial and widely criticized case con-
cerning the concept of final payment is West Side Bank V.
Marine National Exchange Bank.'5 It has been said that this
case had vitiated "for all practical purposes the Code pro-
vision that payment takes place upon completion of the pro-
cess of posting."' 6 The facts are briefly stated. On a Thursday
the drawer gave to Byron Swidler a check in the amount of
$262,000.00 and he in turn deposited it in the West Side Bank
on the same day. The next morning West Side sent the check
through the collection chain to the Marine National Exchange
Bank, the payor. That night the check was charged to the
drawer's account. On the next business day the item was
copied, stamped "paid," cancelled and placed in the drawer's
13. Id. at 96, 203 N.E.2d at 854.
14. Id.
15. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968). For a detailed examination of
this case, See Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Article Four-Process of
Posting Not Complete Until Midnight Deadline, 20 S.C.L. Rnv. 118 (1968).
16. H. RALEY, BRADY ON BANK CHECKS 268 (4th ed. 1969).
19721
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file.17 That afternoon the drawer issued a stop payment order
to Marine who subsequently returned the check. West Side
sued, contending that final payment had occurred by virtue
of the completion of the process of posting, and therefore,
the stop payment order was not effective. However, the court
held that the item had not been finally paid since Section
4-109 (e) includes as a step in the process of posting "correct..
ing or reversing an entry or erroneous action with respect to
the item." Therefore, the court concluded that the process of
posting continued until the statutory time for reversal of
.entries had expired; in other words, the "midnight dead-
line."I' In an excellent analysis it has been said that:
[t]he court interpreted Section 4-109(e) to mean that any entry upon
the drawer's account could be reversed before the "midnight deadline."
It rejected an interpretation which would make "entry" mean only
erroneous entry .... The court, in effect, interpreted the terms
"correcting" and "reversing" to allow a bank either to correct an er-
roneous entry, "or" to reverse that entry for any reason, before the
midnight deadline ....
The phrase "correcting an entry" has its most obvious meaning, not
as an obliteration of the entry, but rather as an alteration of it.19
D. Failure to Revoke Provisional Settlement. The last
method by which final payment may be effected under Section
4-213 is found in Subsection (1) (d) which pertains to the
instance in which the payor bank has "made a provisional
settlement for the item and failed to revoke the settlement in
the time and manner permitted by statute, clearing house
rule or agreement." This subsection would apply in those in-
stances in which Subsection (1) (b) is inapplicable; for ex-
ample, it would apply when a check is received and the bank
makes a provisional settlement but fails to revoke it prior
to the passage of its midnight deadline. 20 In this instance the
check would be considered finally paid even if the process of
posting had not been completed by that time.21
17. This is essentially the procedure of "deferred posting" authorized by
§4-301.
18. The "midnight deadline" is defined in Section 4-104(h).
19. Comment, Uniform Commercial Code-Article Four-Process of Post-
jig Not Complete Until Midnight Deadline, 20 S.C.L. REv. 118, 124-125 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).
20. See U.C.C. §4-301(2).
21. U.C.C. §4-213, Comment 6.
[Vol. 24
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E. Section 4-303 provides several additional factors
which may equally affect the outcome of "the great race,"
although not amounting to "final payment." These additional
events are: acceptance of certification;22 examination and
decision to pay ;23 and accountability under Section 4-302
dealing with the responsibility for the late return of items.24
It has been said that Section 4-213 (1) states the general rule
for final payment for all purposes, 25 whereas Section 4-303 (1)
was meant to deal specifically with the narrow area concern-
ing the relationship between the rights of the payee or holder
as against the rights of the drawer or his creditors.
26
Section 4-303(1) (d) provides in part that any of the
"four legals" has come too late if the payor bank has evidenced
by examination of its customer's account and by action, its
decision to pay. This section has given the payor bank a great
deal of discretion in determining the winner of the "great
race," as evidence by the case of Yandell v. White City Amuse-
ment Park, Inc.27 Here two closely associated corporations
maintained several accounts in their respective names at the
Commerce Bank. In order to insure that none of the checks
would be dishonored, the bank was given the authority to
transfer funds among the several accounts whenever it was
necessary to cover any particular check. On July 29, 1960, the
bank inspected the balance of one of the corporations before
determining whether to honor four of its checks totaling
$7,998.75. The checks were then withdrawn from the machine
posting process and a bank officer entered a pencilled nota-
tion on the corporation's ledger card, indicating that there
were sufficient funds in the account to cover the checks. The
checks were then posted by hand, a procedure which was said
to have manifested the bank's present intention to honor the
checks. On August 1, the plaintiff creditor served a trustee
writ on the bank in an effort to tie up the funds in the cor-
22. U.C.C. §4-303(1) (a).
23. U.C.C. §4-303 (1) (d).
24. U.C.C. §4-303(1) (e).
25. Malcolm, Reflections on West Side Bank: A Draftsman's View, 18
CATaomc U.L. Rtv. 23, 26 (1968).
26. Davis, Article Four: Bank Deposits and Collections, 44 N.C.L. REv.
627, 633 (1966).
27. 232 F. Supp. 582 (D. Mass. 1964).
1972]
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poration's account. The court held, inter alia, that the writ
did not reach the funds. The basis of the decision was that
by virtue of the pencilled notation and the hand posting, the
bank had "evidenced its intent" to honor the four checks prior
to the service of the trustee writ, even though final payment
(through machine posting) did not actually occur until after
the service of the writ. It is interesting to note that, as against
the owner of the item, the bank could have changed its posi-
tion any time before final payment without incurring lia-
bility.
28
III. FAILURE TO ACT PROMPTLY
Code Section 4-302 follows the basic pre-code law29 in
providing that:
[i]n the absence of a valid defense .. . if an item is presented on and
received by a payor bank the bank is accountable for the amount of
(a) a demand item other than a documentary draft whether properly
payable or not if the bank, in any case where it is not also the
depository bank, retains the item beyond midnight of the banking
day of receipt without settling for it or, regardless of whether it
is also the depository bank, does not pay or return the item or
send notice of dishonor until after its midnight deadline; or
(b) any other properly payable item unless within the time allowed
for acceptance or payment of that item the bank either accepts
or pays the item or returns it and accompanying documents.
Although a relatively simple concept, a number of cases
have emerged. The leading case interpreting this provision
is Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co.30
In this case the defendant payor bank held the drawer's check
past the midnight deadline based on the drawer's assurance
that sufficient funds would be deposited to cover the check.
However, the drawer was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the
-check was never paid. The plaintiff, payee of the check,
brought suit under Section 4-302, and the trial court, finding
no valid defense, held the bank liable for the amount of the
check.
28. WILLIER AND HART, U.C.C. REPORTER DIGEST, Comment Al to Section
4-303 (Matthew Bender and Co., 1971).
29. E.g., Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank of Gallitzen, 220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955
(1908).
30. 32 Ill.2d 269, 204 N.E.2d 721 (1965).
[Vol. 24
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On appeal the defendant first contended that it should
not be held liable for the face amount of the check. The de-
fendant pointed out that, unlike other provisions of Article
Four which fix liability, Section 4-302 uses the word "account-
able," which could only mean that it was responsible for (1)
the amount of funds in the drawer's account and, (2) the
damages as measured by Section 4-103 (5) which reads:
The measure of damages for failure to exercise ordinary care in
handling an item is the amount which could not have been realized
by the use of ordinary care, and where there is bad faith it includes
other damages, if any, suffered by the party as a proximate cause.
However, the court rejected this contention on the ground
that Section 4-302 plainly provides that the payor bank is
accountable for the full amount of the check and that "ac-
countable" is synonymous with "liable." The court also stated
that "accountable" was used in order to accommodate the
other sections of Article Four relating to provisional and
final settlements between banks in the collection process.
The case thus seems to stand for the proposition that the
payee or other holder need not establish actual damages re-
sulting from the bank's delay in order to take advantage of
Section 4-302.31 The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has, in the
case of Farmers Cooperative Livestock Market v. Second Na-
tional Bank of London,3 2 come to a similar conclusion. The
court reasoned that:
[a] realistic reading of this statute compels the conclusion that failure
to meet the midnight deadline authorized the person presenting the
check to assume it has been honored and will be paid. Banking prac-
tices require the prompt settlement of such items because of the chain
of credit dependent thereon.33
In Rock Island the defendant bank also alleged that Sec-
tion 4-302 violated the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment since it imposes a liability on a payor bank
for failing to act promptly which is more severe than that
imposed on a depository or collecting bank. The court dis-
missed this contention on the basis that Section 4-302 does
31. Accord, Farmers' Coop. Livestock Mkt, v. Second Nat'l Bank of Lon-
don, 427 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1968).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 250. Accord, Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita,
202 Kan. 450, 450 P2d 1 (1969).
19721
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not create an unreasonable classification since all banks vari.-
ously perform the functions of a payor, collecting and de-
pository bank.
Rock Island was relied upon by the Supreme Court of
Georgia in the case of National City Bank of Rome v. Motor
Contract Company of Rome.34 In this case the defendant payor
bank defended on the ground that the eventual return of the
checks was within the "customary" period of time. The court
rejected this contention, following the traditional rule that:
"Evidence of custom or usage, with the necessary requisites
may be admissible to aid in constructing a contract or to add
incidents thereto. But custom cannot change the positive law
of the state.1
3 0
In Leaderbrand v. Central State Bank of Wichita36 the
Supreme Court of Kansas held that where the defendant payor
bank had on two previous occasions dishonored the plaintiff
payee's check within the midnight deadline in accordance
with Section 4-302, its failure to do so a third time was ex-
cused. The plaintiff twice presented the check, in person, to
the defendant bank, and each time he was orally advised that
there were insufficient funds in the drawer's account. The
plaintiff then deposited the check in his own bank which
forwarded it directly to the defendant for collection. The
defendant held the check for about two weeks before re-
turning it unpaid to the plaintiff's bank. In excusing the de-
fendant's failure to return the check within the midnight
deadline, the court carefully analyzed and applied several code
provisions: Section 3-511(4) provides "[W]here a draft has
been dishonored by nonacceptance a later presentment for
payment and any notice of dishonor and protest for nonpay-
ment are excused unless in the meantime the instrument has
been accepted;" Section 3-104 (2) provides that a writing is
a "draft" if it is an order, and a "check" if it is a draft drawn
on a bank and payable on demand; in accordance with Section
3-508 (3) notice of dishonor may be given in any reasonable
34, 119 Ga. App. 208, 166 S.E.2d 742 (1969).
35. Id. at 210, 166 S.E.2d at 743, citing Happ Bros. Co. v. Hunter Mfg.
Co., 145 Ga. 836, 90 S.E. 61 (1916) ; Georgia Casualty & Co. v. Hardrick, 211
Ga. 709, 88 S.E.2d 394 (1955).
36. 202 Kan. 450, 450 P.2d 1 (1969).
[Vol. 24
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manner, either orally or in writing; and finally, Section 4-301
(3) provides that "[u]nless previous notice of dishonor has
been sent an item is dishonored at the time when for purposes
of dishonor it is returned or notice sent in accordance with
this section." The court therefore in effect concluded that non-
acceptance includes nonpayment, and that nonacceptance ap-
plies to checks as well as drafts.
The court felt that the prior dishonors were a valid de-
fense under Section 4-302, since the above sections disclosed:
A statutory scheme designed to impose a duty upon the payor bank,
where a check is presented for payment and the drawer has insufficient
funds on deposit to cover the item, to give timely notice of dishonor to
the party presenting the check for payment just once. Such notice of
dishonor fixes the time at which the item is dishonored by the payor
bank as to the party presenting such item and subsequent presentment
of the item for collection . . . does not require an additional notice of
dishonor . . . . Under these circumstances any further notice of dis-
honor is excused.3
7
At least one case, Wiley v. Peoples Bank and Trust Co.,as
has expressly disagreed with the reasoning of Leaderbrand,
holding Section 3-511(4) inapplicable because "nonaccept-
ance" ,as used therein is applicable only to time items, since
payor banks do not normally "accept" demand items but
rather pay or refuse payment.
IV. PAYOR BANK'S LIABILITY FOR WRONGFUL DISHONOR
Code Section 4-402 provides:
A payor bank is liable to its customer for damages proximately caused
by the wrongful dishonor of an item. When the dishonor occurs through
mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved. If so proximately
caused and proved damages may include damages for an arrest or
prosecution of the customer or other consequential damages. Whether
any, consequential damages are proximately caused by the wrongful
dishonor is a question of fact to be determined in each case.
The leading case interpreting this section is Loucks v.
Albuquerque National Bank. 39 Here the defendant bank im-
properly charged the funds in the plaintiff's partnership ac-
count toward the payment of a note signed by one of the
37. Id. at 459, 450 P2d at 9.
38. 438 F2d 513 (5th Cir. 1971).
39. 76 N.M. 735, 418 P2d 191 (1966).
19721 No0TES
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partners as an individual. The charge reduced the plaintiff's
account to a balance of only $3.66. At this time there were
at least nine checks outstanding, all of which were subse-
quently dishonored by the bank. In the court below the jury
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs in the amount of
$402.00, representing the amount which had been charged
to the note. The plaintiff appealed on the ground that the
trial judge erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider the
question of punitive damages, damages to the business repu-
tation and credit of the partnership as an entity and of the
partners as individuals, and damages for personal injuries to
one of the plaintiffs. 40 The Supreme Court of New Mexico
affirmed the lower court's ruling that the partners should
not be allowed to recover anything as individuals. The court
reasoned that the partnership was "the customer" as used
in Section 4-402, and therefore it was the only party to which
the defendant bank was required to respond. The defendant
bank owed nothing to either partner individually because
the debtor-creditor relationship existed only between the bank
and the partnership.
41
The court then turned to consider the elements of damage
alleged to have been sustained by the partnership. Section
4-402 states in part that "[w] hen the dishonor occurs through
mistake liability is limited to actual damages proved."
Comment 3 to this section provides:
This section rejects decisions which have held that where the
dishonored item has been drawn by a merchant, trader or fiduciary
he is defamed in his business, trade or profession by a reflection on his
credit and hence that substantial damages may be awarded on the basis
of defamation "per se" without proof that damage has occurred.
40. The plaintiffs sought recovery on behalf of the partnership in the
amount of $5,000.00 for damages to its credit, good reputation, and business
standing in the community; $1,800.00 for its loss of income, and $14,404 as
punitive damages. In addition, each partner sought to recover reputation, and
business standing. The partner who defaulted on the note sought punitive
damages in the amount of $10,000.00, and the other partner sought $60,000.00.
41. As a basis for this interpretation, the court turned to the definition of
4(customer" as found in Section 4-104(e) which reads: "'Customer' means any
person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to col-
lect items and includes a bank carrying an account with another bank." The
court then looked to Section 1-201(30) which defines a "person" as "an indi-
-vidual or an organization," and then to Section 1-201(28) which includes a
"'partnership" in its definition of an "organization."
850 [Vol. 24
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The plaintiff in the instant case had presented some evi-
dence which indicated that the bank had knowledge of the
personal nature of the note and of the partnership's outstand-
ing checks. The court, therefore, held that the jury should
have been allowed to decide whether the subsequent dishonors
were by mistake or in fact intentional. However, the court
refused the claim for punitive damages, for, even though the
dishonor may have been intentional, there was lacking the
element of malice, which was defined by the court as "the
intentional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or
excuse.
,,42
The court further held that one of the partner's claim
for damages resulting due to an ulcer which he developed
during the course of events was not the type of consequential
damages contemplated by Section 4-402, therefore the part-
nership could not recover for loss of income during his
absence.
Another case concerning the question of consequential
damages is Bank of Louisville Royal v. Sims, 43 in which the
plaintiff sought to recover for her hurt feelings or "nerves,"
and for her lost time from work. The court denied her claim,
stating that "these nebulous items of damage bore no reason-
able relationship to the dishonor . . . and consequently they
could not be classified as 'actual damages proved' ",44 under
Section 4-402. The court added, however, that if there had
been evidence of malice on the bank's part, such damages
might have been recoverable.
A recent Indiana case45 has held that upon a wrongful
dishonor of a business check, there arises a presumption that
the customer's credit and standing has been damaged. In not-
ing the probability of such harm the court cited from an ear-
lier case :46
In the modem world the financial credit of a man, particularly
of one engaged in commercial pursuits, is a much prized and valuable
asset. Although laboriously built it is easily destroyed. The banks of
42. 76 N.M. 735, 747, 418 P2d 191, 199.
43. 435 S.W.2d 57 (Ky. 1968).
44. Id. at 58.
45. American Fletcher Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Flick, 252 N.E.2d
839 (Ind. App. 1969).
46. Weiner v. North Penn Bank, Inc., 65 Pa. Super. 290 (1916).
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the country, through which the great volume of our commercial busi-
ness is transacted, have a deserved reputation for accuracy and care
in the conduct of their affairs. Hence when a check of a depositor is
refused at the counter of his bank, that comes within the sphere of his
transactions, promptly imputes the blame to him rather than to the
bank... .4
V. STOP PAYMENT ORDERS: FAILURE TO HONOR
Section 4-403 is the basic provision governing stop pay-
ment orders. It provides in part:
(1) A customer may by order to his bank stop payment of any item4s
payable for his account but the order must be received at such
time and in such manner as to afford the bank a reasonable oppor-
tunity to act on it prior to any action by the bank with respect to
the item described in Section 4-303.
(3) The burden of establishing the facts and amount of loss resulting
from the payment of an item contrary to a binding stop payment
order is on the customer.
This discussion is limited to the payor bank's liability in the
event a customer's check is paid over his stop payment order.
49
It has been said that a drawer has an absolute right to
stop payment since a check, before it is paid, is merely the
drawer's order, revocable at his will, and a payor bank making
payment over such an order does so at its peril.5 0 At the com-
mon law it was generally held that a bank paying a check over
a stop payment order could not charge the amount of the item
to the drawer's account ;51 . . . nor could it ever recover the
amount paid from a good faith holder.5 2 However, under the
Code the bank's liability in such a situation is far from abso-
lute, and as will be seen, if liable, it will often be able to re-
47. Id.
48. The use of the words "customer" and "item" implies that this section
is not limited to drawers of checks, but extends as well to makers of notes
and other instruments. See U.C.C. §4-403, Comment 4.
49. For an excellent treatment of stop payment orders in general, see
Hawkland, Stop Payment Orders Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 3
U.C.C. LAw JOURNAL 103 (1970).
50. See generally Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Guaranty Bank and
Trust Co., 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958).
51. E.g., German Nat'l Bank v. Farmers' Deposit Bank, 118 Pa. St. 294,
12 A. 393 (1888).
52. E.g., Nat'l Bank of N.J. v. Berrall, 70 N.J.L. 757, 58 A. 189 (1904).
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cover from the payee or other holder on the theory of subro-
gation.
In Cieci v. Lincoln National Bank and Trust Company
of Central New York 53 the plaintiff gave to one Santo a check
in the amount of $3,000.00. Subsequently, the plaintiff issued
a written stop payment order-no issue was raised as to its
timeliness or effectiveness. The defendant payor bank there-
after paid the check in violation of the stop payment order.
The defendant raised two defenses: (1) that the check was
issued by the plaintiff to pay off an outstanding loan and
therefore the plaintiff suffered no loss when the check was
paid, and (2) that the check was issued to pay an unlawful
gambling transaction and therefore the plaintiff was estopped
from making any claim against the bank.
The court disallowed the bank's second defense, holding
that the plaintiff's action was not based upon the check itself,
but upon its wrongful dishonor under Section 4-403. In short,
the defendant was not allowed to raise any circumstances
surrounding the issuance of the check because the plaintiff
could make out his case without any reference to the nature
of the transaction.
On the other hand, the defendant's first defense was
found to be valid. The court recognized that Section 4-403 (3)
was contrary to pre-code law, for "in New York . . . a prima
facie case was made out by the depositor against the bank for
breach of a timely stop payment order . . . without any alle-
gation of damage." 54 The court held, nevertheless, that under
the Code the "fact and amount of loss" 55 was an element of
the depositor's prima facie case and thus denied the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment since the plaintiff's pleading
did not allege a demand for repayment and refusal from the
payee of the check. The plaintiff argued that he had been
damaged in that his bank account had been reduced by
$3,000.00, the amount of the check. However, the court stated
that if it adopted such a contention, Section 4-303 (3) would
become meaningless.5 6
53. 46 Misc. 2d 465, 260 N.Y.S.2d 100 (1965).
54. Id. at 469, 260 N.Y.S2d at 103.
55. U.C.C. §4-403(3).
56. See also Brewster Bumper Corp. v. Irwin Savings & Trust Co., 44
Pa. D. & Co. 2d 138 (Westmoreland County Ct., 1967).
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In Universal Credit C.LT. Corporation 'v. Guaranty Bank
and Trust Company, 5 7 the plaintiff depositor was likewise
unable to show a loss as a result of the defendant's disregard
of a stop payment order. In this instance the payment was
made to a holder in due course and the plaintiff would have
been liable for the amount of the check even if the stop pay-
ment order had been honored.58
The payor bank's second advantage under the Code is
that if it is held liable to the drawer for the amount of the
item, it still has available the right of subrogation by virtue
of Section 4-407 which provides:
If a payor bank has paid an item over the stop payment order of the
drawer or maker or otherwise under circumstances giving a basis for
objection by the drawer or maker, to prevent unjust enrichment and
only to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason of
its payment of the item, the payor shall be subrogated to the rights
(a) of any holder in due course on the item against the drawer or
maker; and
(b) of the payee or any other holder of the item against the drawer
or maker either on the item or under the transaction out of which
the item arose; and
(c) of the drawer or maker against the payee or any other holder of
the item with respect to the transactions out of which the item
arose.
It has been stated that "[t]he aim of the code provision
is clear enough: the payor bank by paying over a stop order
would have paid out its own money and would be given reme-
dies to make itself whole."5 This principle was liberally
applied in the New Jersey case, South Shore National Bank v.
Donner.60 The action was brought by a payor bank which
alleged that the defendant Mark and Bette Donner, husband
and wife, had conspired with defendant Ruth Satsky Jewelry
and its president, Jules Bruskin, in willfully overevaluating
a burglary loss sustained by the Donners. The defendants
57. 161 F. Supp. 790 (D. Mass. 1958). Although this case arose before
the Code became effective in Massachusetts, the court made reference to it,
regarding it as largly a restatement and clarification of existing law.
58. The court recognized that if the payor bank had been liable to the
drawer for the amount of the item, it would have had the right of subrogation
by virtue of prior case law and Section 4-407(a). See U.C.C. §4-407, Com-
ment 1.
59. Editorial Staff, 79 Banking Law Journal 185, 204 (1962).
60. 104 N.J. Super. 169, 249 A.2d 25 (1969).
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reported a $7,000.00 loss to the insurer which promptly issued
a check in that amount payable to the Donners. Upon discov-
ering the overevaluation the insurer stopped payment of the
check. However, it was subsequently mistakenly paid by the
plaintiff bank upon presentment.
The defendants Bruskin and Ruth Satsky Jewelry ad-
mitted making the appraisal, but contended that it was made
without payment or other valuable consideration and that they
did not receive any portion of the proceeds of the $7,000.00
check. They also argued that Section 4-407 limited the plain-
tiff bank's cause of action to those parties who were unjustly
enriched, and that the only parties so enriched were the Don-
ners, the payees of the check. They further argued that they
were not "holders of the item" as required by Section 4-
407(c).
The court dismissed all of these contentions, stating that
Section 4-407 must be read in light of and in conjunction with
other provisions of the Code.
The sense of a law is to be gathered "from its object and the nature
of the subject matter and the whole of the context and the acts in
pari materia. The parts of a statute are to be viewed in relation to the
whole and the motive which led to the making of the law, and recon-
ciled, if possible, to carry out the reasonably probable legislative
policy.
6 1
Comment 8 to Section 4-403 provides in part:
The drawee is ... entitled to subrogation to prevent unjust enrich-
ment (Section 4-407); retains common-law rights ... in cases where
the payment is not made final by Section 3-418.
The court then turned to Section 3-401 (1), which states
that "[n] o person is liable on an instrument unless his signa-
ture appears thereon." Comment 1 to this section provides:
Nothing in this section is intended to prevent any liability arising apart
from the instrument itself. The party who does not sign may still be
liable ... in tort for misrepresentation ....
61. Id. at 175, 249 A.2d at 28. The court first turned to §1-102, stating that
its provisions mandated a liberal construction of the Code. The court then
emphasized Section 1-103, which provides:
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the prin-
ciples of law and equity including the law merchant and the law
relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud,
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Applying the above provisions, the court then placed the
plaintiff payor bank into the shoes of the drawer insurance
company as though no stop payment order had ever been
issued and proceeded to apply simple tort law and held all
three defendants liable as joint tortfeasors. The court rea-
soned that such a result was consistent with the apparent
legislative intent
*.. to grant to a payor bank... a full and effective remedy by way of
subrogation to the rights and remedies of the drawer or make against
the payee as well as those who have, by their tortious acts in connec-
tion with him, combined to produce the single indivisible result ...
the remedy being furnished not only to prevent unjust enrichment
but also to the extent necessary to prevent loss to the bank by reason
of its payment of this item.61A
In effect, the court extracted the basic theory of subroga-
tion from Section 4-407 and applied it in conjunction with
existing common law tort principles. In doing so the court
disregarded the express limitations of Section 4-407(c),
which, if read together with the entire section, only subro-
gates the bank to the rights of the drawer against the payee
or other holder for the purpose of preventing unjust enrich-
ment. Although the defendants Bruskin and Ruth Satsky
Jewelry were not payees or holders, and were not in any way
enriched, the result, at least in this instance, seems justified.
The result may be consistent with Comment 5 to Section 4-407
which provides, "[t] he spelling out of the affirmative rights
of the bank in this section does not destroy other existing
rights (Section 1-103).'"2
VI. RIGHT TO VARY BY AGREEMENT
In dealing with the various provisions of Article Four,
one should be aware of Section 4-103 (1) which provides:
The effect of the provisions of this title may be varied by agreement
except that no agreement can disclaim a bank's responsibility for its
own lack of good faith or failure to exercise ordinary care or can
limit the damages for such lack or failure; but the parties may by
61A. Id., at 177-76, 249 A.2d at 29-30.
62. For additional cases dealing with Section 4-407, see Wells v. Washing-
ton Heights Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 63 Misc. 2d 424, 312 N.Y.S.2d
236 (1970), which refused to allow subrogation on the ground that the drawer
had no such right against the payee; Commercial Insurance Co. v. Scalamander,
56 Misc. 2d 628, 289 N.Y.S. on the payor bank to establish that the payee was
not entitled to the proceeds of the check.
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agreement determine the standards by which such responsibility is to
be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable. 63
The Code drafters felt that in light of the technical com-
plexity of the field of bank collections, the numerous number
of checks handled by each bank each day, the certainty of
changing conditions, and the possibility of developing im-
proved methods, it would be unwise to freeze the present
methods of operation by mandatory statutory rules. 64
Subsection (2) of Section 4-103 provides that official
or quasi-official rules, such as Federal Reserve regulations,
operating letters, and clearing house rules will have the effect
of "agreements" under Subsection (1), above, even if not
specifically assented to by all the parties concerned. This pro-
vision was included in view of the fact that more often than
not the various parties within the collection chain will not
have direct dealings with each other, and may not in fact
have knowledge of each other's existence, therefore a specific
agreement with each party would be impossible.
In drafting agreements which vary the provisions of
Article Four it is important to note that a general disclaimer
is prohibited, and that any standard measuring a bank's re-
sponsibility must not be "manifestly unreasonable." For
example, in the case of Thomas v. First National Bank5 the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held void as against public
policy a stop payment order which contained a release pro-
viding, "Should the check be paid through inadvertence, acci-
dent or oversight, it is expressly agreed that the Bank will
in no way be held responsible. ' 66
VII. CONCLUSION
It has been said that the purpose of Article Four is:
... not to reform but to codify and simplify. It embraces more specific
details than the A.B.A. Bank Collection Code and its effort is to an-
nounce definite black and white rules rather than general principles.
The effort to make the rules "mechanical" may seem at times to have
63. See also U.C.C. §1-102.
64. See U.C.C. §4-103, Comment 1.
65. 376 Pa. 181, 101 A.2d 910 (1954).
66. Although the Code was not yet in effect, the court implied that the
same result would follow under Section 4-103. See U.C.C. §4-103, Comment 1.
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resulted in unnecessarily complex statutory syntax, but when the full
meaning and implication of the rules are understood by bankers and
bank lawyers, there should be established a certainty as to the handling
of bank deposits and collections which has heretofore been absent.
6 7
In spite of the "mechanical rules," the cases which have
evolved thus far have, with only a few exceptions, interpreted
the provisions of Article Four in light of and in conjunction
with each other and with other applicable Articles within the
Code. Such an approach allows a degree of flexibility with
which to meet unusual circumstances and changing conditions
without sacrificing any degree of certainty which is so neces-
sary in the commercial world.
ROBERT W. HERIONG
67. R. Foster, INaODucTIoN To SOTTH CAROLINA REPoRTER's CoMMENTs,
2A S.C. CODE Ax. 349 (1966).
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